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A VMware zero-day let attackers forge the keys to the datacenter

Broadcom patched a 9.8-rated flaw in vCenter on Nov 19 that let an attacker log in as administrator without a password. Mandiant says a suspected China-linked group had been using it since early September.

A black ink fingerprint pressed on warm cream paper, its ridges running diagonally across the frame, with one ridge traced in deep vermillion red
A fingerprint in black ink on cream paper, with one ridge traced in red: the identity that passes every check but belongs to no one.
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In brief

  • Broadcom patched CVE-2026-123890, a 9.8-rated authentication bypass in vCenter's directory service, on Nov 19 in VMSA-2026-0009. There is no workaround.
  • Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group say the suspected China-linked group ARMORY CASTLE exploited the flaw as a zero-day in early September 2026.
  • The group's BONESAW tool creates a vCenter admin account, copies the directory database, and steals the SAML signing key used to forge admin login tokens.
  • The intrusion began with a separate zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support, then moved through a Linux appliance to vCenter and on to ESXi hosts and a Windows virtual machine.
  • Fixed in vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, and 8.0 U3m; vCenter 7.0 needs extended support and 6.5/6.7 should be presumed affected. Patching does not remove access already established.

On Thursday, Broadcom patched a hole in VMware vCenter that let an attacker log in as the administrator without knowing any password. The flaw scored 9.8 out of 10, and it had already been used.

Mandiant and Google's Threat Intelligence Group say the suspected China-linked espionage group ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221, exploited the flaw in early September, more than two months before the patch arrived. The group did not just break in. It brought a custom-built tool that copies vCenter's entire directory database, steals the key vCenter uses to sign login tokens, and forges tokens granting administrator access, no password and no second factor required.

vCenter is the console that manages every host and virtual machine in a VMware setup, so compromising it is closer to taking the building's master key cabinet than to compromising one server. That is what makes a 9.8 here different from a 9.8 in a single application.

The flaw in the login handshake

The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-123890. It sits in the VMware Directory Service, the component called vmdir that handles vCenter's single sign-on. When someone logs in, the directory service runs a cryptographic handshake called Secure Remote Password, or SRP, in which the password itself never crosses the network: the two sides prove they know it and derive a shared session key.

The flaw leaks that session key. Mandiant says the directory service exposes it through its remote procedure call interface on TCP port 2012, and the session identifiers it generates are predictable because they are built from timestamps. An attacker with network access to vCenter can pull the key out and open an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local, the built-in top-level account. From that session, the attacker can run commands and copy files, including the directory database itself, a file called data.mdb.

No password is needed at any point, and no user has to click anything. Broadcom's advisory puts it plainly: "A malicious actor with network access to vCenter may exploit this issue to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the system." Broadcom lists no workaround. The only fix is the patch.

A tool built in July

The group had been ready for a while. Its exploitation tool, which Mandiant calls BONESAW, is written in Go and carries a build timestamp of July 13, 2026, sixteen days before Broadcom disclosed a different vCenter authentication bypass, CVE-2026-59309, on July 29. The two flaws are distinct: the July one worked through malformed LDAP packets on ports 389 and 636, while this one works through the directory service's RPC interface on port 2012. Mandiant found logs showing BONESAW running in early September against a vCenter server that had already been patched against the July flaw. The group had a second key to the same door while everyone was changing the first lock.

BONESAW does more than open the session. It copies the directory database, pulls out the private signing key vCenter's token service uses, creates a backdoor administrator account, and grants itself Global Administrator privileges. A second tool, SAWSNAKE, uses the stolen signing key to forge login tokens, the technique called Golden SAML, letting the attacker sign in as any user and bypass multi-factor authentication.

How the intrusion unfolded

The vCenter attack was the second half of a longer intrusion. It started with a different zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support, CVE-2026-102764, described by Mandiant in a blog post on October 15. From the compromised Remote Support appliance, the group moved to an internal Linux appliance with no endpoint detection software on it and set up camp.

Two small web shells went in first: SLIMSAVAGE, which runs commands and answers to the password "123", and CAGEMATCH, which stages files. The group then gave itself root by flipping a permission bit on /bin/env through the debugger, scanned the internal network for VMware ports, and downloaded BONESAW in a password-protected archive.

Once inside vCenter, the group turned on SSH through the appliance's management interface, stole vCenter's master encryption key and database password file, then turned SSH back off. It logged in to the ESXi host console and over SSH as root, added its own public key to root's authorized keys, and browsed the virtual machines' disks with a custom Python tool. It pulled the Windows domain database, NTDS.dit, with the SYSTEM and SECURITY registry hives and DNS data, out of a Windows virtual machine's disk file, packed the haul into an archive, and moved it out through the Remote Support appliance.

A Slack-based backdoor, LAZYBONES, and a modified SSH server, BEARBONES, kept footholds elsewhere: six malware families and utilities in one campaign, across three different kinds of device.

Patching closes the hole, not the access

Broadcom calls the update an emergency change. That is the right first step, and it is not the whole job. A patch fixes the flaw. It does not remove the administrator account BONESAW created, and it does not un-steal the signing key. As long as a forged token is trusted, the attacker can keep walking in the front door with credentials vCenter itself considers legitimate. Any organization that finds signs of this intrusion needs to rotate the signing keys and audit the administrator accounts, not just install the update.

Mandiant's write-up makes a related point about the defenses in place. vCenter ships with a host firewall managed through its web management interface, and the group used that same interface to switch SSH on. Mandiant recommends its VCSA Hardening and Logging Tool instead, which enforces firewall rules at the operating-system level, below the management interface, so a compromised administrator account cannot switch them off. In its analysis, that tool would have broken the attack chain at several points.

What to patch, and the catch

The fixed versions are vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, and 8.0 U3m. VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x customers apply vCenter 8.0 U3m through the asynchronous patching process in Broadcom knowledge base article 88287, and update SDDC Manager to 5.2.5. The updates cannot be installed through vCenter Quick Patch, and running virtual machines keep running while vCenter itself is briefly unavailable.

Two complications are worth knowing first. vCenter 7.0 is affected and past end of general support, so a fix comes only through an extended support contract, and Broadcom's FAQ says to presume vSphere 6.5 and 6.7 are affected too. The other is an upgrade trap: 8.0 U3m and 9.0.2.0200 block a later upgrade to VMware Cloud Foundation 9.1.1, so organizations mid-upgrade should wait briefly for 9.1.2 or finish the upgrade first and patch there.

The same advisory also fixes three SDDC Manager flaws, reported by Arnoldas Radisauskas of NATO's cyber security centre, and a SAML token signature bypass in VMware Tools for Windows, reported by Noam Pomerantz. The Tools update touches every Windows virtual machine, so it is the larger rollout of the two.

As of Thursday, no public exploit code had surfaced, per Censys's advisory tracker. That will not last. The patch went out on November 19; the tool that exploited the hole was compiled on July 13. Four months passed between the weapon and the fix, and the people holding the weapon were in no hurry: until Thursday, nobody else knew the flaw existed.

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